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 ABSTRACT 
Goal Interdependencies and Opportunism for Supply Chain Partnerships  
in China 
by 
Wu Lanjun 
Master of Philosophy 
 
The possibility of opportunistic behavior is an important barrier to the collaboration 
between partners in the supply chain as partners pursue their self-interests with guile. 
Opportunistic behavior threatens the partners’ relationships, influences their work 
accomplishment and prevents future collaboration. This study hypothesizes that 
opportunism is not just the result of people’s self-interests pursuit but depends on 
how they think their self-interests are related. Opportunism in organizational 
partnerships could be understood in terms of how partners perceive their goals are 
related to each other. When partners believe that their goals are competitively or 
dependently rather than cooperatively related, they are more likely to pursue their 
self-interests opportunistically.  
 
Altogether 86 face-to-face interviews were carried out in Beijing, Nanchang and 
Guangzhou, China to explore the links and relations among goal interdependencies, 
opportunism and the outcomes. Participants who work in a supply chain partnership 
were asked to describe an incident regarding their collaboration with their partners. It 
included the people involved, the reasons, what occurred, and the consequences. 
Structural equation modeling explored the proposed model that goal 
interdependencies could affect the levels of opportunism and thus influence the 
partnerships. Results suggest that cooperative goals are important foundations for 
effective organizational partnerships. 
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Chapter I 
INTRODUCTION 
Companies increasingly emphasize specialized skills in the supply chain and they 
collaborate with their partners with complementary skills for the mutual benefit. 
Both scholars and managers have recognized the increasing importance of 
collaboration in supply chain. Fierce competing market and technology 
specialization make it critical that companies build an efficient partnership with their 
partners. We witness that organizations that develop effective partnerships with their 
partners can better meet their customers’ needs and outperform others and survive. 
Managers are now increasingly encouraging collaborative activities across 
organization borders in the supply chain (Spekman et al., 1998; Womack et al., 1990; 
Myhr & Spekman, 2002).  
 
Effective partnerships are based on more than just transactions and work completion. 
Collaboration between partners becomes an overall and comprehensive idea in the 
supply chain. For instance, customers will continue asking for the high quality 
product from suppliers, but they also want to feel confident that their technology 
partners are reliable and trustworthy, as well as will be collaborate with them in the 
long term (Michael, 2003). Transparency and confidentiality are also critical in the 
supply chain partnership now (Dyer & Chu, 2003; Love & Gunasekaran, 1999). As 
suppliers and customers want to believe that they are under little risk in disclosing 
important information and technologies. This study identifies four important criteria, 
namely relationship enhancement, work productivity, future collaboration and 
innovation to measure the efficiency and quality of partners’ partnerships in supply 
chain.  
 
The opportunistic behavior between partners is an important barrier to their 
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partnership because it involves partners’ self-interests with guile (Williamson, 1985, 
1991). However, although partners would view opportunism as unethical, it does 
occur in relations among organizations in supply chain (Ghoshal & Morgan, 1996; 
Griesinger, 1990; Johanson & Mattsson, 1987; Maitland, Bryson, & Van de Ven, 
1985; Moschandreass, 1997). Moreover, fearing that their partner would notice that 
and feel unfair and exploited, they may engage in those activities that can mask their 
opportunism (Wathne & Heide, 2000; Williamson, 1985, 1991).  
 
Thus, it is important to study the conditions that would possibly facilitate or inhibit 
opportunism. In order to identify the conditions that impact opportunism, we used 
goal interdependence theory to investigate the relationship between how partners 
understand their goals to be related to each other and the level of opportunistic 
behaviors. Our hypothesis is that what’s critical is not whether partners are highly 
self-interested or not but how partners understand their self-interests to be related to 
each other. The next sections discuss the paper’s objectives and contributions. 
 
Significance of this Study 
Objective of this Study 
This research aims to study partnerships between partners within the supply chain. 
Specifically it has two aims: First, it explores the effects of opportunism on 
partnerships. Specifically, we study how the opportunism affects relationship 
enhancement, work productivity, future collaboration and innovation in the supply 
chain. Second, it uses the theory of cooperation and competition to understand and 
predict people’s opportunistic behaviors. 
 
Contributions of this Study 
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This study makes several contributions to the literature. In addition to testing the 
generalization of the theory of cooperation and competition and the theory of 
opportunism, to supporting those theories with both qualitative and quantitative data, 
this study investigates the conditions for opportunistic behaviors and tests the 
opportunistic behaviors’ effects on the efficiency of the partnership.  
 
This study applies the theory of cooperation and competition to study the conditions 
for opportunism and tests the generalization of the theory of cooperation and 
competition; few studies have tried to examine opportunism behavior between 
partners with the antecedents of the goals interdependencies. This study demonstrates 
the important role of goal interdependencies in understanding people’s opportunistic 
behavior. Cooperative goals are hypothesized to contribute to low level of 
opportunism and then lead to constructive outcomes. In contrast, competitive and 
independent goals are expected to lead to a high level of opportunism and thus harm 
the partnerships. Contrary to the transactional cost theory that regards the pursuit of 
self-interest as the reason for opportunism, this study proposed that opportunism in 
organizational partnerships should not be simply understood as an outcome of 
self-interests, but should be understood in terms of how partners understand their 
self-interests are related to each other. Those hypotheses, if tested, can provide an 
important understanding towards conditions for opportunistic behaviors. 
 
Secondly, this study links the literatures on goal interdependencies, opportunism, and 
four outcomes for the partnerships. The study tests the effects of cooperative goal on 
the level of opportunism which then influences the partnerships. With positively 
related goals, partners can improve their relationships and work productivity, and 
raise the possibility of future collaboration and innovation, through the mediator of 
opportunism.  
 
Thirdly, this study can also contribute to the literature on goal interdependence and 
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opportunism study by directly examining the interactions between the Chinese 
partners. As the theory and scales for goal interdependence and opportunism are 
developed from the west, it tests the generality and consistency for those theories in 
doing study in China. Finally, it uses both quantitative and qualitative data to test the 
hypothesis and theories and provides cases reported by partners with conditions of 
different goal interdependencies.  
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Chapter II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
After the introduction part of this study about the background and objectives in the 
first chapter, this chapter reviews the studies on opportunism and supply chain 
partnerships. First, definition and concept on opportunism will be discussed to 
understand the idea. Then this study examines how the opportunistic behavior affects 
the partnership in supply chain and different approaches of people’s opportunistic 
behavior in different cultures, especially in collectivistic culture of China. This will 
be followed by the introduction of the theory of cooperation and competition, which 
is the theoretical framework of this study. Finally, the chapter summarizes the 
literature review and proposes the hypotheses. 
 
Understanding Opportunism 
Opportunism in this paper is defined as the behavior by economic agents that 
involves “Self-interest-seeking with guile” (Williamson, 1985, 1991). Williamson 
emphasized that in relations among organizations, such behaviors like fierce 
bargaining or strong disagreement are not opportunistic, nor are the advantages that 
are resulted from having a unique skill or location. Activities like taking shortcuts, 
masking poor quality work, breaking promises and being dishonest in order to get 
benefit are common examples of opportunistic behavior. However, although most 
people would view opportunism as unethical, it does occur in relations among 
organizations. Any organizations can engage in opportunistic behavior, regardless of 
their position and relation with others.  
 
Opportunism in the Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) 
In modern theories of economic behaviors, information problems are becoming very 
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important (like search costs, asymmetric information, etc.), combined with 
temptations of opportunism (Charles, 1990). These educe the transaction costs and 
raise important and interesting issues of organizations. Over the last two decades, 
transaction cost theory has become prominent in the academic researches and one of 
the most influential statements about this theory is made by Williamson (1975, 1985). 
Based on Williamson’s work, researchers have used the transaction costs to explain a 
wide range of economic phenomena of organizations including opportunism. In a 
word, transaction cost theory has become quite influential in determining our 
thinking. 
 
One of the central assumptions of this theory is that the risk of opportunism is 
inherent in the relationship among organizations in any transaction. Opportunism is 
defined as “self-interest seeking with guile”. This includes not only the apparent 
behaviors like lying, stealing and cheating, but also refers to the offering of 
incomplete or distorted information with the purpose to misleading, confusing or 
blinding others for one’s own benefit.( Williamson, 1985). The costs of negotiating, 
monitoring, and controlling to ensure against these possible behaviors in a 
transaction are called transaction costs. Williamson (1985) argued that among the 
three alternative governance structures, namely ‘market’, 'hierarchy' and 'between 
market and hierarchy’, only the optimal one will survive, which minimizes the sum 
of production, transaction and organization costs under current conditions of 
technology and institutions. If the transaction costs of undertaking an exchange 
through the market are greater than the costs of exchanging within a hierarchy, it is 
more efficient to conduct the exchange within a hierarchy according to transaction 
cost theory (Jones & Hill, 1988; Williamson, 1985). Opportunism is a crucial factor 
in this choice. Without it, partners will always keep their promises and act according 
to the contract thus minimize the transaction costs (Williamson, 1985).   
 
However, this theory has its own limitation. Research suggests that the formal 
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contract often play a limited role in the relationship between organizations 
(Macaulay 1963). Even if a contract exists, often many informal agreements or social 
norms affect the relationship (Hart & Moore 1999; Heide & John 1992; Wilson 
1980). For example, rail freight relationships are often governed by those unwritten 
rules for the volume and equipment they use (Palay, 1984). People will reflect on 
their behaviors in a transaction and it may be from their comparison with others, in 
the social roles, and in identification with others as models (Argyle, 1994). All of 
these are examples of so-called relational contracts or social contracts (Macneil 1978) 
and several authors explicitly discuss opportunism within the context of such 
contracts (Gibbons 1999; Williamson 1996). 
 
Opportunism in the Social Relation 
There is a much wider context other than the contract that can influence the risk of 
opportunism which transaction cost theory neglects to consider. Other contexts may 
include such as the social network which economic transactions is in and the 
invisible hand of many market mechanisms. In another words, the social relation is 
the network of partnership between organizations and organizations that are 
dependent on each other.  
 
Within transaction cost theory, opportunism is viewed as the violation of an explicit 
contract, more resent studies argue that opportunism also includes violation of 
relational contracts (Gibbons 1999; Williamson 1996). This has been specified by 
Granovetter (1995), who argued that the social context which transactions are in has 
a great impact on the behavior of the organizations.  
 
Trust Theory and Opportunism  
As we know, the social relation between two parties exists when each party decides 
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his or her behavior totally or in part according to the behaviors of the other with his 
or her expectations. Organizations are under behavioral risk when they are uncertain 
about the behavior of the partner when the behavior may materially affect them. 
Trust is a meaningful concept for the parties to a social relation if and only if at least 
one party is exposed to an element of behavioral risk.  
 
In the literature on trust (Gambetta 1988), this notion is described as the one’s 
subjective probability that one’s partner will do no harm. The following is the 
definition of trust by Nooteboom, 1996: ‘The subjective probability is that the 
partner will not utilize opportunities for opportunism, even though it would be to his 
material (or economic) benefit.’ 
 
Trust is always believed to be a more favorable opinion of human nature and 
sometimes it is regarded to have opposing meaning to opportunism. Hill (1990) 
furthered the costs theory that when trust prevails, it could serve to eliminate the risk 
of opportunism. Trust could economize on the cost of transactions. Efficient 
exchange relations are realized when the different parties trust each other. The 
presence of trust can benefit a partner relation by reducing the costs of specification, 
monitoring and guarding against opportunistic behaviors, encouraging better 
business decisions, and ensuring rapid and efficient responses to unforeseen events 
and realizing relational contracts. Trust is one of the reasons why transaction is often 
governed by many unwritten contracts and verbal promises, rather than the strictly 
written legal forms. Partha Dasgupta (1998) argued that trust is central to all 
transactions and yet economists rarely discuss this notion.   
 
However, many sociologists and economics have begun to treat trust as self-interest 
calculativeness (Bradach & Eccles, 1989; Dore, 1983; Coleman, 1990; Williamson, 
1993). According to James Coleman, trust only occurs when the expected gain from 
being at the risk of trust is positive. James Coleman (1990) pointed out that: 
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“Situations involving trust constitute a subclass those involving risk. They are 
situations in which the risk one takes depends on the performance of another actor.” 
According to Williamson, trust is just calculative self-interest on a higher level. 
Completely non-calculative trust occurs only in 'personal trust', such as in the 
relationships with friends, family or other loved ones. 
 
Ethics is part of culture issue which can provide a basis for trust within a partnership. 
But it doesn’t imply a complete eliminate of calculativeness. People may still be 
tempted by opportunism if the reward is high enough and it is called ‘golden 
opportunity'. That is why trust, based on ethics or personal bonds, cannot totally 
eliminate the risk of opportunism.  
 
Reputation Mechanism and Opportunism 
The reputation mechanism is well known as an implement that can limit 
opportunistic behavior, but it is also known that its operation is limited to the 
conditions of monitoring, so that it may not be perfect. Only on the basis of 
reputation mechanism, opportunism remains in the relationship between 
organizations if self-interest is the only force of behavior (Nooteboom, 1996). 
 
The reason is that monitoring of opportunism is never perfect and costless. When we 
assume that there is an automatic and costless reputation mechanism, controlling or 
monitoring still require costs and opportunism remains if the potential reward is less 
than the penalty of opportunism 
 
This study uses the definition of opportunism by Williams and traditional operations 
of the concept. However, this definition includes a broad range of potentially 
different behaviors. If the concept of opportunism itself is poorly understood, 
documenting its potential outcomes is problematic. This section further reviews and 
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discusses current theoretical perspectives on opportunism to describe opportunism 
more specifically. 
 
In the original transaction cost literature, opportunism is defined in general terms as 
“self-interest seeking with guile” (Williamson, 1975). This distinguishes 
opportunism from the standard self-interest–seeking behavior by including the notion 
of guile. In subsequent work, Williamson (1985) describes ‘guile’ as “lying, stealing, 
cheating, and calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate, or otherwise 
confuse.” In these practical terms, the characterization of opportunism indicates that 
human beings are only “weakly moral” (Douglas, 1990) and cannot be counted to 
abide by contracts or fixed rules of interaction with each other (John, 1984; 
Williamson, 1993).  
 
Indeed, studies have suggested that formal contracts typically play a relatively 
limited role in understanding opportunism (Macaulay 1963). Consequently, 
researchers have examined opportunism in social relations generally. Specifically, 
transaction cost theory has extended the original concept of opportunism to the 
domain of relational contracts (Muris, 1981; Williamson, 1979, 1985, 1991). But the 
precise meaning of the opportunism concept itself in relational contracts has not been 
stated clearly.  
 
Macneil (1981) suggests that it is necessary to begin with the definition of the term 
“guile”, which he defines as “taking advantage of opportunities with little regard for 
principles or consequences.” However, this definition requires “principles and 
consequences” to be defined. Researchers have different perspectives about this: 
Economists often emphasize consequences and outcomes whereas legal scholars 
emphasize principles. This study focuses on violations of principles. Opportunism is 
regarded as the behavior that violates operative principles and norms with the 
intention is to gain more benefits for the self.   
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For example, some researchers have argued that taking advantage of a lock-in 
condition may violate a principle itself, namely, the exploitation of another party’s 
vulnerability (Barney, 1996; Sabel, 1993). Conceptually, a lock-in situation transfers 
the collaboration between two parties from a pattern of unconstrained bargaining or 
exchange (Graham & Peirce 1989) into a command business (Macaulay, 1985), in 
which one party lacks the ability to retaliate. In our opinion, although exploiting 
vulnerability may be inconsistent with some general ethical norms, taking advantage 
of a lock-in situation would not be considered as opportunistic unless it violated an 
existing rule operating in that relationships. According to Macneil (1981), identifying 
a behavior of opportunistic requires an assessment of whether it was “contrary to the 
principles of the relation in which it occurs.” Otherwise, a given behavior, even if it 
takes place under conditions of unequal bargaining power, only represents 
conventional self-interest seeking. 
 
Therefore, in this paper, opportunism is considered to involve those behaviors of 
cheating and slacking related to an implicit or explicit contract, with the intention of 
seeking one’s own interest. For example, the traditional moral hazard problem 
describes how the information asymmetry enables one organization to supply lower 
level of quality or output of the products than that was contracted for. In this case, 
the organization utilizes information asymmetry to conduct some behaviors that are 
against the contract with its partner in their collaboration, with the intention to obtain 
more benefits for itself and thus is opportunistic as defined here. 
 
According to previous studies, opportunistic behavior is reduced by self-interest or at 
least self calculativeness and it is hard to avoid. However, people with different 
culture backgrounds may have different attitudes and thinking towards opportunism. 
The next section continues to discuss opportunistic behavior under different cultures, 
especially in China where the data for this study were collected. 
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Opportunism and Culture Differences 
Based on the above analysis, opportunistic behavior is induced by people’s 
self-interest seeking. People’s diverse self-values and their beliefs of their 
interdependence with others that influences their attitudes and approaches towards 
opportunism behavior in their partnership can help us understand opportunistic 
behavior in different cultures 
 
Diverse Self-values in Different Cultures 
Anthropological and psychological studies provide support for the idea that self 
concept varies across cultures. Smith & Bond (1998) emphasized the “distinction 
between the independent conception of the self fostered by individualistic culture and 
the interdependent conception of the self fostered by collectivist culture”. For 
example, Kitayama (1991), Roland (1988) and Shweder & Bourne (1984) found that 
people in the United States had extremely different view of the self, others, and the 
interdependence of the two than people in India and Japan. 
 
Individualistic culture promotes a view of the self which is individualized, 
independent and autonomous, and comprises a unique combination of inner attributes. 
By contrast, collectivist culture emphasizes the relations of individuals with each 
other which the common sense of self is familial and highly relational in the society. 
Behavior is oriented from harmonious interdependence with others rather than the 
expression of individuality and self achievement (Ash, 2000). 
 
Values on Opportunistic Behavior in Collectivistic Culture  
Based on the above discussion, Collectivistic people may often avoid opportunism 
because they value interpersonal relationship highly and avoid the possible behavior 
that may damage the relationship (Ding, 1995; Jehn & Weldon, 1992; Kirkbride, 
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Tang, & Westwood, 1991; Leung, 1997; Triandis, 1989; Triandis, McCusker, & Hui, 
1990; Tse, Francis, & Walls, 1994). For example, a number of authors have argued 
that in Japan, organizations economize on governance, enable less opportunistic 
behavior and build fruitful relations, on the basis of more trustful, long term relations 
(Dore, 1989; Cusumano & Fijimoto, 1991; Helper, 1991; Dyer & Ouchi, 1993). Also, 
‘relational bonds’ are thought critical for doing business in China and Chinese people 
are regarded as less likely to be opportunistic (Hwang, 1987, 1997–1998, 2000; Lee, 
Pae, & Wong, 2001).  
 
However, this strong relational bond can not ensure a low level of opportunism in 
collectivistic cultures. First, organizations in Collectivistic Culture can just be 
calculative in that they understand the value to maintain the social relation. Once the 
potential benefit is more than the penalty of guilt, they may be tempted to be 
opportunistic (Nooteboom, 1996). Second, Collectivistic people may conclude that 
their partners are out-group member and once they think so, they are likely to exploit 
them (Chen et al., 2002). As a result, opportunism is a likely barrier to partnerships 
in Asia as well as in the West. It is interesting and valuable to study opportunistic 
behavior in China. 
 
Supply Chain Partnership and Opportunism 
Although people with various cultures and backgrounds may have different levels of 
likelihood of opportunism, opportunism is found to be prevalent in partnerships 
between organizations. It can be an important barrier to collaboration between 
partners in a supply chain partnership. 
 
Supply Chain Partnership 
Successful partnerships are based more on just transactions and work completion. 
Collaboration between partners becomes an overall and comprehensive idea in the 
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supply chain. For example, partners want to feel confident that the other party is 
reliable and trustworthy, as well as will collaborate with them in the long term (Dell, 
2003). Also, transparency and confidentiality are critical in the supply chain 
partnership (Dyer & Chu, 2003; Love & Gunasekaran, 1999). As suppliers and 
customers want to believe that they are under little risk to disclose important 
information and technologies to each other.  
 
Developing innovation creates competitive advantage in organizations. It helps them 
respond to the changes quicker and solve problems better. Innovation has been 
proved to help groups and organizations accomplish objectives easier and more 
effective (Williams, 2006). Through making constant innovation in its supply chain, 
a company can better achieve customer satisfaction by responding to customers’ 
needs promptly.  
 
Innovation could involve a large number of changes to an organization’s activities 
that lead to the improvement of its performance. These changes can be improved 
products and processes, investments in new machines and trainings and the creations 
of intellectual properties (Rogers, 1998). Researchers have shown a strong 
relationship between market performance and innovation (Thomas, 1993). Both 
supplier and customers are now facing fierce competition in this dynamic market, so 
they must learn how to innovate so as to compete with many other competitors on 
responding to buyers’ need rapidly, improving buyers’ satisfaction and adapting to 
the changing marketplace. As a source of knowledge and information, it is critical 
that the companies in supply chain can help each other innovate successfully. 
 
Based on the previous ideas, we identified four important criteria in this study, 
namely relationship enhancement, work productivity, future collaboration and 
innovation to measure the efficiency and quality of partners’ partnerships in supply 
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chain.  
 
Opportunism in Current Supply Chain Partnership  
Economic activity may be more efficient when it is conducted within a single 
organization, or hierarchy, rather than through a market of several organizations. 
Opportunism is an important reason in this (Williamson, 1975; Williamson & Ouchi, 
1981). The possibility of opportunism emergency is much less in hierarchical 
relationships within an organization than it is in the relations among organizations as 
among organizations as there is no formal hierarchy to monitor people’s behavior 
(Parkhe, 1993). Also, the incidence of opportunism will be low when relationships 
among organizations are long-term rather than short-term. Thus, opportunistic 
behavior has become particularly critical as organizations are relying more and more 
on supply chain partnership to do business and are moving away from the short-term 
pattern of the traditional supply chain to build a long-term partnership to better 
respond to the competing and rapidly changing marketplace (Buvik & Gronhaug, 
2000).  
 
Partnerships and Opportunism 
The possibility of opportunistic behavior is an important barrier to the partnership 
between organizations (Williamson, 1985, 1991). Concern about partner’s 
opportunism is quite strong and thinking one’s partner is opportunistic is quite 
harmful to many important aspects of the partnership in the supply chain (Friman, 
Garling, Millett, Mattsson, & Johnston, 2002; Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 1998). 
 
Firstly, the idea that one’s partner has potential opportunistic behavior is harmful for 
the relationship and long term collaboration itself between partners. When 
opportunism occurs, partners become suspicious of each other and regard each other 
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as untrustworthy and unreliable. It damages the partners’ relationship and it is hard 
for them to build a trusting and long term relationship again. On the contrary, a low 
level of opportunism enables more trustful and long term collaborations between 
partners (Nooteboom, 1996).  
 
Secondly, opportunistic behavior makes people distrust each other, inhibiting 
openness (Sabel 1993), which decreases the efficiency and productivity of the 
relationship (Bradach & Eccles 1989, Dyer & Chu 2003, Zaheer & Venkatraman 
1995). Moreover, opportunism increases the need for monitoring and increases 
transaction costs thus lowering productivity (Anderson & Narus 1990, Bradach & 
Eccles 1989, Nooteboom, 1996).  
 
Thirdly, the process of innovation requires a combination of products, markets, 
information and technologies that most companies do not have. Companies have 
realized that their suppliers and customers may have the knowledge and information 
they lack which can be helpful for them to improve product and service quality and 
meet customer needs. By building a good partnership with low risk of opportunistic 
behaviors, organizations in supply chain can share their knowledge and information 
more openly and fully, so that they are more knowledgeable and resourceful; 
organizations in supply chain can also help each other gain more insight to buyers’ 
need so that they can improve product or service according to buyers’ needs. As a 
result, organizations can continuously innovate to strengthen their market 
competitive advantage (Ansari & Modarress, 1990; Child & Yan, 2003; Frey & 
Schlosser, 1993; Hardy, Phillips & Lawrence, 2003; Ireland, Hitt & Vaidyanath, 
2003). In this way, in a positive supply chain partnership with low risk of 
opportunistic behavior, supply chain could act as an important source for innovation. 
However, this kind of openness and sharing of information is hard to achieve in the 
partnership with high level of opportunism. Opportunism decreases the possibility of 
innovation in a supply chain partnership.  
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Based on the previous discussion above, this study proposes that opportunism leads 
to bad outcomes in the partnership in the supply chain. Specifically, we propose that 
partner opportunism affects four important outcomes, namely relationship 
enhancement, work productivity, future collaboration and innovation. Specifically, 
the first four hypotheses are developed as: 
 
H1: Opportunism reduces partners’ relationship enhancement in the supply chain.  
H2: Opportunism reduces partners’ work productivity in the supply chain. 
H3: Opportunism reduces partners’ future collaboration in the supply chain. 
H4: Opportunism reduces partners’ innovation in the supply chain. 
   
To summarize, opportunism is prevalent in the partnership between organizations 
and it damages the supply chain partnership in many aspects. Recent literature on the 
inter-organizational relationship has focused on strategies to control and manage 
opportunism. Surprisingly, little attention has focused on what reduces opportunism 
itself. We need to understand the conditions that affect the extent to which 
organizations are likely to engage in opportunism behavior in the relations with their 
partners in supply chain. The next section introduces the cooperation and 
competition theory to help us understand when opportunism is less likely.  
 
Goal Interdependence Theory and Opportunism 
As define by Williamson (1985, 1991), opportunism is the behavior that involves 
“Self-interest-seeking with guile”. Previous research about opportunism tend to 
argue that partners should be less focused on their self-interest zealously and more on 
their common benefit and their relationship. In the transaction cost theory, 
self-interest pursuit is regarded as harmful and results in opportunism (Provan & 
Skinner, 1989). In the relation transaction theory, trust, ethics or people’s relation 
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may lead to low level of opportunism but they could all be treated as calculative 
self-interests. In this sense, completely non-self-interest and trust do not exist in the 
partnership between organizations (Williamson, 1991). 
 
However, the pursuit of self-interest is basic to human nature and it is hard to 
eliminate. Alfred, Tjosvold & Zi-you (2005) pointed out that what is critical is not 
the extent to which organizations are self-interested or whether they pursue their 
self-interest, but how they believe their self-interests are related to each other. When 
people confirm that their interests are positively related to their partners, they 
develop a relationship that leads to low levels of opportunism. This study uses 
Deutsch’s (1973) theory of cooperation and competition to explain and develop this 
idea. 
 
Introduction of Goal Interdependence Theory 
Deutsch (1973) proposed that it is how people perceived their goals are related that 
affects and determines the interactions between individuals, groups and organizations. 
The premise of the theory of cooperation and competition is that the way goals are 
related determines how the individuals, groups, and organizations interact and these 
interaction patterns in turn affects outcomes (Deutsch, 1949, 1973; Johnson & 
Johnson, 1989). The way people think their goals related to others affects their 
interaction so that people may promote the success of others, obstruct the success of 
others, or pursue their goals regardless of the success or failure of others. Deutsch 
identified these three kinds of alternatives as cooperation, competition, and 
independence.  
 
Researchers have already shown the effects of goal interdependence between 
individuals and groups and in some inter-organizational interaction (Cook, 1984; 
Tjosvold, 1988; Wong, Tjosvold & Yu, 2005). This study helps to test that this 
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theory can also apply to understand the relationship between supply chain 
organizations. 
 
Cooperation, Competition, and Independence 
In cooperation, people perceive their goals are positively related so that they think if 
they reach their goals, others can reach their goals as well. One will success if and 
only if others success. They understand one’s goal achievement helps others reach 
their goals. So people in cooperative situation want each other to work for their goals 
effectively, because the other’s effectiveness is necessary to help all of them reach 
their goals. 
 
In contrast to cooperation, people in competitive situation believe that their goals are 
negatively correlated, that is, if one person attain one’s goal, all the others may fail or 
less likely to attain their goals. This is called a ‘win-lose’ situation. People believe 
that they can perform better when others perform ineffectively. When others are 
effective, they are less likely to succeed themselves. Competitive goal 
interdependence makes people want to beat others and prove they are the best and 
they are frustrated when others work effectively and successfully. They fight against 
each other to win.   
 
Independence goals occur when people believe their goals are unrelated. One’s goal 
attainment has no influence on the goal attainment of others. So the success by one 
neither make others fail nor succeed. In such condition, people believe that whether 
others act effectively or not, success or not means little to them.  
 
The relationship of their goals has important effects on expectations, interaction and 
outcomes. In cooperation, people know that other’s success could help them, so that 
they want others to work hard and effectively for their mutual benefit. (Lewicki, 
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McAllister & Bies, 1998). On the contrary, people in competition expect others to 
work ineffectively and fail and they may even try to hander other’s work for their 
own benefits. (Deutsch, 1973; Johnson et al., 1981; Stanne et al., 1999). They just 
want to win others in the competition. With independent goals, people tend to do 
their work regardless of others. They have no interest in helping or harming others 
and become indifferent to the performance of others.  
 
Goal Independences and Opportunism  
Cooperation and competition theory suggests that opportunistic behavior is much 
more likely to happen when partners believe their goals are competitive and 
independent related than partners with cooperative goals. In cooperation, people 
consider their goal achievements and interests are positively related. They help each 
other to work effectively for their mutual interests and this in turn maximize their 
self-interests thus the potential opportunistic behavior reduces.  
 
However, with competitive goals, the failing of other’s reaching their goals can 
facilitate their own goal reaching. They may even be tempted to obstruct the goal 
progress of others and behave opportunistically. So as long as they view their 
interests as negatively related with their partners, they may engage in opportunistic 
behavior can help them seek their own interests by means of obstructing others 
reaching their goals. With independent goals, people expect that others will work for 
their own goals with little regard for the goals of others. Generally, independent 
goals have been found to have similar effects on the interaction of people as 
competition, although not as strong (Deutsch, 1973; Johnson et al., 1981). Both 
competition and independent goals can encourage people’s opportunistic behavior. 
 
Opportunism is not just the result of pursuit self-interests but of how self-interests 
and goals are related; goal interdependencies are critical factors that influence 
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opportunistic behavior in partnerships in supply chain. Based on the above 
discussion, the hypotheses are: 
 
H5a: Partners with cooperative goals in a supply chain engage in a low level of 
opportunism. 
H5b: Partners with competitive goals in a supply chain engage in a high level of 
opportunism. 
H5c: Partners with independent goals in a supply chain engage in a high level of 
opportunism. 
 
Why do we use opportunism as the mediator between goal interdependence and 
outcomes? Collaboration is superior to individual action in achieving many goals, 
from moving very heavy things to operating a complex organization. However, given 
that people have inconsistent (or at least only partially consistent) goals with each 
other, how can the collaboration be achieved and maintained? This is also the case 
for the collaboration between organizations. In Williamson's view, parties 
collaborate or abstain from collaborating based entirely on the calculation of the 
expected self-benefits. And if they cannot achieve what they want by collaborating 
with others, they may well engage in opportunism in search for larger benefits. In 
addition, if they do not believe each other can be restrained by contracts or norms, 
the parties must control and monitor to protect themselves from opportunistic 
behaviors.  
 
What are the most efficient means for ensuring against the possible hazards of 
opportunism? Perceived cooperatively related goals and benefits between 
organizations could be an effective means. As discussed before, with cooperative 
goals, organizations consider their goal achievements and interests are positively 
related. They tend to help each other to work effectively for their mutual interests 
and at the same time maximize their self-interests, thus reducing the potential of 
 
22
opportunistic behaviors. In contrast, with competitive goals, the failing of other’s 
goals attainment facilitates their own goal reaching. They may even be tempted to 
obstruct the goal progress of others and behave opportunistically. Independent goals 
have generally been found to have similar effects as competition, although not as 
strong. All in all, how organizations believe their goals are related may very much 
affect the level of opportunism.  
 
Therefore, this study uses goal interdependence as an important variable to explain 
organization’s possible behavior of opportunism. Goal interdependence is 
hypothesized to affect partnerships through the mediator of opportunism. The 
hypothesized model is also consistent with the basic proposition of goal 
interdependence theory in that how people believe their goals are related is 
hypothesized to affect the dynamics of their interaction and these dynamics in turn 
affect outcomes. 
 
Summary  
Opportunism is prevalent in the partnerships between organizations in the supply 
chain and is defined as partners’ pursue of self-interest with guile (Williamson, 1985, 
1991). Studies already demonstrated the harmfulness of opportunism to supply chain 
partnerships in many organization issues (Friman, Garling, Millett, Mattsson, & 
Johnston, 2002; Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 1998). These include deterioration of 
relationship enhancement, work productivity, future collaboration and innovation 
ability and so on. Researchers have recognized it is necessary to identify the 
conditions under which opportunism occurs and partners become suspicious of each 
other (Chen, Peng, & Saparito, 2002; Maitland et al., 1985). 
 
Both transaction costs theory and social theory argue that it is people’s pursuit of 
self-interest that leads to opportunism. Theories point out that opportunism is 
inevitable due to the human nature of self-interest, despite taking into 
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consideration of many social issues like trusting, ethics and reputation mechanism. 
However, this kind of concept ignores the situation when people share the common 
goals and believe their self-interests are positively related but are still jealously 
self-interested. Therefore this study adopts the concept that this pursuit of 
self-interest itself is not harmful for the partnership and it does not lead directly to 
opportunism. The critical issue is how they believe their self-interests are related to 
each other. When self-interests are considered positively related, partners have low 
levels of opportunism and build effective partnerships (Alper, Tjosvold & Law, 
2000).  
 
Thus self-interest is not always destructive; it is how people consider and conduct 
their self-interest that largely determines the outcomes. Goal interdependence theory 
is therefore very useful in this study to understand people’s opportunistic behaviors. 
It indicates that people’s perceptions of their goal interdependencies influence their 
interactions with each other in managing their self-interest, and finally lead to 
different outcomes regarding opportunism (Deutsch, 1973). Based on this theory, 
three kinds of goals interdependencies, namely cooperative, competitive and 
independent goals are identified to characterize people’s attitude toward opportunism. 
In cooperative situations, people construed their goals as positively related and one’s 
goal achievement helps others also achieve their interests. Therefore they help each 
other to seek mutual self-interests and thus reduce opportunistic behavior. In a 
competitive condition, members believe their goals are negatively related; one’s 
success makes others less likely to be successful. Consequently, people treat their 
self-interests as incompatible, thus they try to earn their own benefits at the expense 
of others and it encourages opportunism. Independent situation shares the same 
outcomes as competitive ones. 
 
Though developed in the west, goal interdependence theory has also been shown to 
be effective in the Asian countries, like China. Opportunism cannot simply be 
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understood as the result of self-interest. Having cooperative goals is regarded to be a 
constructive approach toward self-interest seeking in supply chain partnership, which 
can generate more positive outcomes compared with competitive and independent 
goals.  
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CHAPTER III 
HYPOTHESES 
After a review on the previous studies on opportunism in Chapter II, this chapter 
displays all the hypotheses that have been developed based on the literature review. It 
first presents the hypothesized model and then explains the variable and the study’s 
six hypotheses.  
 
Hypothesized Model 
 Figure 1 Hypothesized Structural Model in this Study 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As shown in the figure above, the basic model to be tested in this study is that 
perceived goal interdependence affects opportunistic behavior and then leads to four 
outcomes. In this model, cooperative, competitive and independent goals are 
identified as antecedents to affect the outcomes of relationship enhancement, work 
productivity, future collaboration and innovation. Seven hypotheses are listed below:  
Cooperative 
Goal 
Competitive 
Goal
Independent 
Goal 
Opportunism
Relationship 
Enhancement 
Work 
Productivity 
Future 
Collaboration 
Innovation 
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H1: Opportunism reduces partners’ relationship enhancement in the supply chain.  
H2: Opportunism reduces partners’ work productivity in the supply chain. 
H3: Opportunism reduces partners’ future collaboration in the supply chain. 
H4: Opportunism reduces partners’ innovation in the supply chain. 
H5a: Partners with cooperative goals in a supply chain engage in a low level of 
opportunism. 
H5b: Partners with competitive goals in a supply chain engage in a high level of 
opportunism. 
H5c: Partners with independent goals in a supply chain engage in a high level of 
opportunism. 
 
Model Variables 
This study proposes that people’s perception of their goal relationships with their 
partners affect their actions toward opportunism that influences the supply chain 
partnership in many aspects. There are seven variables in the hypothesized model 
with three antecedent variables, two mediators and four outcomes. All the variables 
are measured in 7 point Likert-scales. 
 
This section defines each variable in the model (Figure 1): 
Cooperative goals are measured by the extent the interviewees think their 
goals and their partners’ are positively related. 
Competitive goals are measured by the extent the interviewees think their 
goals and their partners’ are negatively related. 
Independent goal is measured by the extent the interviewees think their goals 
and their partners’ are unrelated. 
Opportunism is measured by the extent to which the one’s partner was 
perceived to be willing to pursue its own interests with guile. 
Relationship Enhancement is measured by the effect of the interaction 
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between the partners on their feelings and attitudes toward each other. 
Work Productivity is measured by the effect of the interaction between the 
partners on their task accomplishment of their collaboration. 
Future Collaboration is measured by the effect of the interaction between the 
partners on the likelihood of their future effective collaboration. 
Innovation is measured by the effect of the interaction between the partners 
on their improved ability to develop new and useful ideas and products.  
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CHAPTER IV 
METHOD 
This research studies opportunism in supply chain relationships between suppliers 
and customers in China. I used an interview-based study to collect the data to test the 
hypothesis. In half a year, I interviewed 86 people in mainland China for the sample 
of this study. 
 
Participants 
Eighty-eight employees were involved in this study and two of them felt it hard to 
understand some of the questions and did not provide all the answers, so their 
answers are not included. Of the 86 participants, 34 are the suppliers and 52 are the 
customers. Of all the respondents, 50 are male and 36 are female and the average age 
is 36. 72 of them said the supply chain relationship they talked about existed for 
more than 1 year. 63 of them have bachelor degree and 7 of them have higher degree. 
 
Of the 34 suppliers (See Table 1), 59% were male, 85% of the supply chain 
relationships they talked about existed for more than 1 year, 71% had a bachelor 
degree and 11% had either a master or a doctorate degree. 
Table 1 
 
Number of Participants Percentage 
Gender   
Male 20 59% 
Female 14 41% 
The partnership’s existence   
< 1 year 5 15% 
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> 1 year 29 85% 
Educational level 
  
Without Bachelor degree 6 18% 
Bachelor degree 24 71% 
Graduate degree 4 11% 
 
Of the 52 customers (See Table 2), 58% were male, 83% of the supply chain 
relationships they talked about existed for more than 1 year, 75% had a bachelor 
degree and 6% had either a master or a doctorate degree. 
Table 2 
 
Number of Participants Percentage 
Gender   
Male 30 58% 
Female 22 42% 
The partnership’s existence   
< 1 year 9 17% 
> 1 year 43 83% 
Educational level 
  
Without Bachelor degree 10 19% 
Bachelor degree 39 75% 
Graduate degree 3 6% 
 
I tried to choose the samples that could reflect the diverse business, gender, age and 
education level in China. I choose those who are actually working in a supply chain 
relationship and who are likely to understand the questions. Consequently, there are 
86 satisfactory participators from different business and with different genders, ages 
and education levels. While the sample is too small to represent Chinese mainland as a 
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whole, these interviews are diverse in studying supply chain relationships.  
 
Interview 
Critical Incident Technique (CIT) was used in this study. During the interview, each 
interviewee was first asked to describe a concrete example when he/she interacted 
with a person(s) from another organization in his/her supply chain and they disagree 
with each other or somehow need to negotiate regarding an issue. After that the 
interviewee was asked to rate specific questions based on the recalled example on 
7-point Likert-type scales. Measures include goal interdependencies, opportunism 
and four outcomes of their relationship and work effectiveness.  
 
Critical Incident Technique 
The critical incident technique (CIT) (Flanagan, 1954) was used in this study to 
develop the interview structure. CIT is considered to be very useful when studying 
complex interpersonal phenomenon (Walker & Truly, 1992). This method could help 
moderate the errors when persons need to summarize across many incidents to give a 
respond in most surveys (Schwartz, 1999). 
 
Interviewees were first asked to describe a recent incident when they disagreed with 
a person (s) from another organization in his/her supply chain during their 
collaboration or somehow needed to negotiate regarding an issue with that person(s). 
They need to recall the reason of this instance, people involved, what happened, 
people’s reaction and the outcome. The outcome can be one that they thought was 
satisfactory or unsatisfactory. After the describing the instance, they answered 
specific questions regarding the instance they described. The scales include goal 
interdependencies, opportunistic behavior and four outcomes of their relationship 
and work performance. In order to reduce biases, interviewees were not informed of 
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the hypotheses in the whole process. Before the interview, they were told their 
responses could be kept totally confidential.   
 
Interview Schedule 
The interviews were conducted in mainland China during the summer of 2007 and at 
Christmas. Each interview lasted for almost one hour and was conducted in 
Mandarin. First, I did some pre-tests among colleagues and Chinese friends in Hong 
Kong before the summer break. I wanted to make sure the interviews are practical 
and the questions are understood. I made some changes according to their feedback 
and suggestions. Later, I went to Beijing and Nanchang to collect data during the 
summer in 2007. It took one and a half months to do the interviews. After that 
summer, I went to Guangzhou to collect data again during the Christmas break. The 
interviewees were relatives, friends, formal classmates and those introduced to me by 
them.       
 
Scales 
Goal Interdependence  
Based on Deutsch’s (1949, 1973) cooperation and competition theory, three items in 
form of 7-point Likert-scale (from 1=strongly disagree to 7=strongly agree) taken 
from Alper, Tjosvold & Law (1998) indicated how the interviewees construed their 
relationship between their goals and those of the partners in the supply chain 
relationship in the incident. The first item “How much would your reaching your 
objectives help the other person reach his or her objectives” measured the extent to 
which interviewees assumed a cooperative goal relationship with their partners. The 
second item “How much would your accomplishing your objectives interfere with his 
or her objectives” measured competitive goals between the partners. And the last item 
‘In your mind, how related was your reaching your objectives with the other reaching 
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his objectives’ measured independent goal relationship and is a reversed item.  
 
Opportunism 
An opportunism scale developed in the West was used here (Parkhe, 1993). The six 
opportunism items measured the extent to which the partner was perceived to be 
willing to pursue its own interests with guile. For example, sometimes our partner 
alters the facts slightly in order to get what they need. The scale demonstrated 
acceptable reliability. The opportunism scale has a Cronbach alpha reliability of 0.86. 
 
Relationship Enhancement 
A three-item scale taken from Tjosvold & Sun (2000) was developed to measure the 
extent that the interviewee improved his/her relationship with the partner after the 
interaction, i.e. the extent this interaction strengthen the interviewees’ relationship 
with the other person in the incident. The relationship scale had a Cronbach alpha of 
0.83.  
 
Work Productivity 
This scale is to measure the extent that the interviewees’ interaction with others 
helped to solve the current problem effectively and efficiently. This 3-item scale has 
a Cronbach alpha reliability of 0.7. A sample item is “how efficiently did you and 
your partner accomplish the task in this interaction”. 
 
Future Collaboration 
A three-item scale was developed to measure the interviewee’s inclination to 
collaborate with the partner in the future (Tjosvold, Andrews & Struthers, 1991). For 
example, “To what extent do did you want to collaborate with this person in the 
future after this instance”. The future collaboration scale had a Cronbach alpha of 
0.91.  
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Innovation 
Interviewees were asked to rate the effect of innovation from the incident using a 
four-item scale developed by Burpitt & Bigoness (1997). Example item is “How 
much did this interaction help you seek out information about new markets, products, 
and technologies from sources outside the organization.” The innovation scale had a 
Cronbach alpha of 0.90. 
 
Table 3 Scales and Reliabilities 
Measures Number of Items Alpha 
Opportunism 6 0.86 
Relationship Enhancement 3 0.83 
Work Productivity 3 0.7 
Future collaboration 3 0.91 
Innovation 4 0.9 
 
Analysis 
Both qualitative and quantitative analyses were used in this study. Regarding the 
quantitative data, it is based on the interviewees’ ratings on the scales we developed. 
Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was first applied to test whether the respondents’ 
ratings would load on opportunism, relationship enhancement, work productivity, 
future collaboration and innovation as five distinct factors. Sample difference was 
then analyzed to test whether the hypothesized model differed across the two groups 
of respondents: the suppliers and customers, as well as three groups: interviewees 
work in Beijing, Nanchang and Guangzhou. Correlation analysis was used to have 
initial tests of the relationships among different variables, i.e., how would the three 
types of goal interdependence relate to the level of opportunism, and how the 
opportunism related to the four outcomes. Structural equation modeling (SEM) was 
then used to further study the causal relationships among goal interdependencies, 
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opportunism, relationship enhancement, work productivity, future collaboration and 
innovation.  
Regarding the qualitative data from the’ narrative recording of the interviews on the 
incidents, I selected specific case studies to understand the conditions that lead to 
opportunistic behaviors and the outcomes. 
 
Scale Validation 
I carried out a series of confirmatory factor analyses test whether the respondents’ 
ratings would load on opportunism, relationship enhancement, work productivity, 
future collaboration and innovation as five distinct factors. Although most of the 
items used in this study have been validated in the previous study, some of the scales 
are first developed in the West, the forms and values may be different than those in 
China. Also, some of the questions are differently structured. Therefore, it is 
necessary to examine if these scales are appropriately organized. 
 
We excluded the three goal relationships items from the confirmatory factor analyses 
because each of the three goal interdependent scale has one single item. 
Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was then performed to validate that the five 
scales are distinct variables. The results are shown in Table 4. 
Table 4 Validation through Confirmatory Factor Analyses 
Models 
d.f. Model χ²
 
Δχ² NFI NNFI CFI 
Baseline 5-factor Model (M0) keeping opportunism,
Relationship enhancement, Work Productivity, Future 
collaboration and Innovation as distinct factors 
125 281.18 . .74 .84 .83 
4-factor Model (M1) including a combined 
opportunism and Relationship enhancement factor  
129 310.79 29.61 .72 .81 .80 
4-factor Model (M1) including a combined 
opportunism and Work Productivity factor 
129 308.85 27.67 .72 .81 .80 
4-factor Model (M1) including a combined 
opportunism and Future collaboration factor 
130 474.7 193.52 .57 .64 .63 
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4-factor Model (M1) including a combined 
opportunism and Innovation factor 
129 346.63 65.45 .68 .77 .76 
2-factor Model (M6) including a combined 
Relationship enhancement, Work Productivity, Future 
collaboration and Innovation factor 
134 374.86 93.68 .66 .75 .74 
One factor solution (M7) 135 509.76 228.58 .53 .61 .60 
Notes:  
* N of cases =86 
* In the one-factor Model (M7), all the factors were combined into one factor. 
* NFI Bentler-Bonnett Normed Fit Index; CFI Comparative Fit Index; NNFI Bentler-Bonnett Non-Normed Fit Index. 
 
Table 4 shows the results of these confirmatory factor analyses which indicate a good 
fit between our proposed five-scale model and the data. The 5-factor model fits the 
data the best with the Comparative Fit Index (CFI) and the Bentler-Bonnett Fit Index 
(NFI) as .83 and .74, respectively. This 5-factor model was then compared to four 
different 4-scale models. The first comparative model was the 4-factor model, in 
which we merged opportunism and relationship enhancement into one aggregate 
factor. The second comparative model was the 4-factor model in which we merged 
opportunism and work productivity into one aggregate factor. The third comparative 
model was the 4-factor model, which we merged opportunism and future 
collaboration into one aggregate factor and the fourth one is to merge opportunism 
and innovation factors. The 2-factor comparative model included a combined 
relationship enhancement, work productivity, future collaboration and innovation 
factor. And the last comparative model is 1-factor model, which all the factors were 
combined into one factor. 
 
Results in Table 4 show that chi-squares of all the comparative models increase 
significantly compared with the hypothesized model. The comparative models also 
have significantly lower fit indices than the hypothesized model. Therefore, the 
comparisons of the models suggest that the 5-factor proposed model is a distinct 
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measure of the constructs in our study. However, the CFI score of 0.83 for the 
original 5-factor model is not satisfactory given the usually critical value of .90 
(Bentler & Bonnett, 1980). A possible reason is that some items for the variables are 
cross-loaded on two or more factors (items that had loadings of greater than 0.3 on 
more than one factor). After we did the Factor Analysis and deleted some items that 
are cross-loaded (item 1, 4, 11 and 13), we re-did the CFA. The CFI score rose to 
0.90 without the deleted items, which is regarded as acceptable according to the 
critical value. However, to make the items for each variable consistent with the 
original measures, we did not delete the cross-loaded items that led to a low CFI.  
 
Hypotheses Test 
We first tested whether the differences of groups of respondents had effects on the 
results. We divided all the participants into three groups according to their cities and 
tested the differences of their responses between interviewees who worked in 
different cities in mainland China. We also tested the differences of their responses 
between interviewees who were suppliers and customers. 
 
The hypothesized mediating effects model (M0) was first compared to the direct 
effects model (M1) (shown in next chapter). The direct effects model implies that goal 
interdependence impacts outcomes directly while the mediating effects model 
proposes that opportunism mediate between goal interdependence and outcomes.  
At the same time, other models except the direct effects model may fit the data 
equally well. So we also compare the hypothesized model to the second alternative 
model (M2) that opportunism is the antecedent of goal interdependencies which then 
impact the outcomes.  
 
Summary 
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Eighty-six Chinese employees who worked in a supply chain relationship were 
interviewed in Beijing, Nanchang and Guangzhou, during the period from June 2007 
to December 2007. We used critical incident technique to develop the interview. 
Interviewees were first asked to describe an incident when they disagreed or needed 
to negotiate with their partners. They then answered specific questions based on the 
recalled incidents. Scales included goal interdependencies, opportunistic behavior 
and the four outcomes of relationship enhancement, work productivity, future 
collaboration and innovation.  
 
Both qualitative and quantitative data were collected and analyzed. CFA results 
validated the five distinct scales. Correlational analysis was used to do the initial test 
of the relationship among variables in the hypothesized model. Structural equation 
modeling (SEM) was then adopted to explore the causal relationships among goal 
interdependencies, opportunism and the outcomes. Some specific cases were selected 
to understand the conditions that lead to opportunistic behaviors and the outcomes. 
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CHAPTER V 
RESULTS 
Chapter four described the methods used to analyze the quantitative and qualitative 
data. This chapter reports how we analyze the data collected from the interviews and 
presents the results of data analyses. Specifically, it describes the sample and 
regional difference analysis, correlational analysis, structural equation modeling 
analysis, and the results. Lastly, it presents the cases. 
 
Sample Difference Analysis 
A first step was to determine whether the interviewees’ respondents to the variables 
differed across suppliers and customers.  
Table 5 Results of sample difference Analysis  
  df Mean Square F Sig. 
(1) Cooperation 1 10.877 2.933 .090 
(2) Competition 1 4.774 1.496 .225 
(3) Independence 1 .058 .018 .892 
(4) Opportunism 1 .187 .121 .729 
(5) Relationship Enhancement 1 1.927 1.114 .294 
(6) Work Productivity 1 .112 .120 .730 
(7) Future Collaboration 1 1.153 .572 .451 
(8) Innovation 1 12.872 9.617 .031 
 
Table 5 shows the results that there are no significant differences in the two groups of 
interviewees’ responses towards our variables, which indicates that the suppliers 
group and customers group are not significantly different. We combined the two sets 
of data into one. 
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Regional Difference Analysis  
Differences of the recorded variables between interviewees who worked in Beijing, 
Nanchang or Guangzhou were also tested. The effects of the interviewees’ working 
city were examined to see whether cultural background and working environment 
significantly affected interviewees’ responding. Given the reason that the three cities 
of China are in different phrases of development and have different cultures and 
traditions in doing business in the supply chain, we may assume that the reported 
goal interdependencies and opportunistic behaviors may differ across the cities the 
interviewees are working on. The results (Table 6) indicate that there are no 
significant effects of the regional factor on employees’ ratings. As the results do not 
find significant differences, we could use all the samples together. 
 
Table 6 Results of Regional difference Analysis  
  df Mean Square F Sig. 
(1) Cooperation 2 6.370 1.708 .188 
(2) Competition 2 10.892 3.601 .032 
(3) Independence 2 9.189 3.094 .051 
(4) Opportunism 2 2.340 1.554 .217 
(5) Relationship Enhancement 2 4.158 2.483 .090 
(6) Work Productivity 2 2.248 2.519 .087 
(7) Future Collaboration 2 3.412 1.732 .183 
(8) Innovation 2 4.572 3.267 .043 
 
Findings for Correlational Analysis 
The results of correlations (see Table 7) provide initial support to the last three 
hypotheses (H5a, H5b and H5c) that cooperative goals between partners lead to low 
lever of opportunism(r = - 0.13) while competitive and independent goals lead to 
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high level of opportunism (r = .18, p < .05; r = .23, p < .05).  
 
For the first four hypotheses that opportunism behaviors lead to undesirable  
outcomes, opportunism is significantly negatively related to the four outcomes of 
relationship enhancement, work productivity, future collaboration and innovation (r 
= -.44, p < .01; r = -0.21, p<.05; r = -.49, p < .01; r = -.22, p <. 05).  
 
Table 7 Correlations 
 Mean Std. D. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
(1) Coorperation 3.62 1.95 -        
(2) Competition 4.27 1.79 -.81(**) -       
(3) Independence 3.73 1.77 -.57(**) .60(**) -      
(4) Opportunism 4.00 1.24 -0.13 0.18(*) .23 (*) (0.86)     
(5) Relationship Enhancement 4.24 1.32 .26 (*) -.29(**) -.21 (*) -.44(**) (0.83)    
(6) Work Productivity 4.17 0.71 -.33(**) .28(*) 0.20 -0.21(*) -0.11 (0.7)   
(7) Future Collaboration 4.00 1.42 .21 (*) -.27(*) -0.14 -.49(**) .68 (**) 0.11 (0.91)  
(8) Innovation 4.17 1.21 0.09 -0.06 0.01 -.22(*) .45(**) 0.17 .34(**) (0.9) 
Notes: 
a    N=86 
b    Values in bracket are reliability (coefficient alpha) estimates. 
c    **p<.01; *p<.05. 
 
Structural Equation Modeling Analysis 
Structural equation modeling analyses were used to explore the relationship between 
goal independencies, opportunism and the outcomes of relationship enhancement, 
work productivity, future collaboration and innovation. We first compared the 
hypothesized model to some alternative models to see if the hypothesized model was 
the best fitted one.  
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Model Comparison  
Two alternative models (M1-M2) were compared with the hypothesized fully 
mediated model (the hypothesized model). Results (see Table 8) indicate that the 
hypothesized model statistics fits the data very well. The χ
2 
of the hypothesized 
model was 15.03 (d.f.=12) and NFI, NNFI and CFI were 0.95, 0.99 and 0.98, 
respectively. Given the usually critical value of .90 (Bentler & Bonnett, 1980), 
results of the fit statistics suggested that the hypothesized model fitted the data quite 
well.  
However, even if the hypothesized model fits the data well, other alternative models 
are considered and compared. Specifically, the first alternative model (M1) is a direct 
model with the mediator omitted. The second alternative model (M2) indicates that 
opportunism impacts goal interdependence first and goal interdependence then 
impact the dependent variables.  
 
We can see that hypothesized model fit the data better after comparing the 
hypothesized model to the alternative models: For the non-mediated model (M1), the 
χ
2 
was 43.62 (d.f.=7). The χ
2
 for the changed-mediated model (M2) is 34.4 (d.f.=4). 
The hypothesized model thus showed substantial improvement in the chi-square 
indicates over the other two alternative models. 
 
As for other model fits, CFI, NNFI and NFI for non-mediated model (M1) were 0.85, 
0.86 and 0.84, respectively. Those for changed-mediated model (M2) were 0.87, 0.88 
and 0.89 respectively. Overall, the fit statistics indicated that the Indirect Effects 
Model M0 fitted the data best.  
 
Table 8 Results of the Nested Model Analyses 
Indirect Effects Model (M0) Direct Effects Model (M1) Changed-mediated 
Model(M2) 
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Model 2χ  15.03 Model 2χ  43.62 Model 2χ  34.4 
d.f. 12 d.f. 7 d.f. 4 
CFI 0.98 CFI 0.85 CFI 0.87 
NFI 0.95 NFI 0.84 NFI 0.89 
NNFI 0.99 NNFI 0.86 NNFI 0.88 
 
Structural Equation Modeling Analysis for the Hypothesized Model  
The path coefficients of the theorized model help to explore the findings more 
specifically (Figure 2). Those findings on path coefficients generally provide good 
support for this study’s hypotheses.  
 
Figure 2 Result of SEM Analysis  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: 
N=86; 
**p<.01; *p<.05. 
 
Results showed that competitive and independent goals provoked opportunism 
(ß=.098, p<.01; ß=.197, p<.01). However, contrary to the hypotheses, cooperative 
goals did not significantly negatively affect opportunistic behaviours (ß= -.084, 
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p<ns). Consistent with the hypotheses, opportunism significantly affected the 
outcomes of relationship enhancement, work productivity, future collaboration and 
innovation (ß= -.431, p<.01; ß=-.125, p<.05; ß=-.579, p<.01; ß=-.223, p<.01). 
Generally, these findings on path coefficients are consistent with the correlational 
findings and provide good support for the study’s hypotheses. Competitive and 
independent goals between partners reduce to high level of opportunism behavior, 
which do harm to their relationship and work performance. The results will be 
discussed more in the later discussion part. 
 
Illustrative Cases 
Summary of the Incidents  
A total of 86 cases are recorded and the interviewees’ ratings on goal 
interdependencies and their descriptions on the incidents indicated that 49 cases had 
largely cooperatively related goals while 32 cases reported competitive goals. In the 
remaining 5 cases, interviewees reported independent goals.  
 
Most of the interviewees who reported cooperative goals with their partners were 
satisfied with the final results of the instances. All the interviewees expressed that 
they were not satisfied with the results when they had competitive or independent 
goals with their partners. These results were consistent with the correlational and 
structural equation analyses that cooperative goals contributed to low level of 
opportunism and positive outcomes while competitive and independent goals 
contributed to negative outcomes. 
 
Case Illustrations 
Drawing on interviewees’ qualitative accounts of their incidents, we presented three 
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cases, all of which interviewees rated either high or low in the level of opportunism. 
These cases involved competitively related, independent and cooperatively related 
goals, respectively, and suggested how the perceived goal interdependence affected 
the partners’ opportunistic behaviour and how these leaded to different outcomes.  
 
Case A illustrates how perceived competitive goals lead to opportunistic behaviour in 
the supply chain relationship with results of unsatisfactory work performance and 
worse relationship between partners. A male vice-manager in the production 
department of one company reported that they recently purchased two testing 
instruments from another machine supply company. In the process of using the two 
instruments, they found that the outputs of one instrument are not consistent, so they 
contacted the supplier and asked for an exchange or repair. In total, the manager’s 
company changed the instrument for a new one twice during the one year time since 
the purchasing, but the instrument was still not working well. When the interviewee 
reported the problem to the supplier and requested to change the instrument the third 
time, he was told that the guarantee period for the instrument was passed so that he 
could not change a new instrument and the supplier company would also charge the 
repairing fee if he needed the supplier company to repair the instrument. The 
-manager felt very angry about this and thought as long as they have changed a new 
instrument, the guarantee period should be prolonged and the supplier company 
should change or repair the instrument free of charge. He thought he had a 
competitive goal relationship with the supplier that the supplier’s goal was to charge 
the fee of repairmen but his own goal was to get the instrument repaired or changed 
free of charge. He felt that and the supplier just used the guarantee period as an 
excuse not to perform its responsibility and did some unreasonable business just for 
its own benefits. But at last, he had no way to ask for a free repair but paid for the 
repairing fee. As for the outcomes, he reported a very negative relationship with the 
supplier after this incident and felt they had low work productivity in solving this 
problem. He also reported very low confidence for future collaboration with the 
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supplier and low innovation. 
 
Case B illustrates how perceived independent goals leads to opportunistic behaviour in 
the supply chain relationship which then results in unsatisfactory resolution and worse 
relationship between partners. A male manager in a drinking-water company 
described how he ended the supply chain partnership with a customer company who 
had collaborated with them for more than 3 years. The average price of the drinking 
water improved a little in the market, so the manager decided to raise the price of the 
water they sell. But the manager in one of the customer companies required keeping 
the old price. The customer’s reason was that they had collaborated for a long time 
so that his company should be treated specially. The interviewee said he believed he 
and the customer had independent goals. The reason was that his goal was just to sell 
all the water his company’s produces, so even the customer company did not want to 
buy his water any more, he could still sell the water to other customers and keep the 
price the same with the average price in the market. While the customer’s goal is to 
get water with the same price, so the customer may still get water with the old price 
from other water supply company even this supplier company refused to keep the 
price. So under this condition, when the manager simply explained to the customer 
that they could not keep price the same as before, he did not get reply from the 
customer and later, the customer just ended their collaboration without any notice 
beforehand. The manager felt no relationship enhancement after this incident and low 
efficiency in negotiation regarding this issue. He also felt no confidence for future 
collaboration with this customer and gave low rating on the improvement of 
innovation. 
 
Case C illustrates how perceived cooperative goals lead to low level of opportunistic 
behaviour and enables satisfactory outcomes. The interviewee, a female manager in a 
state-owned manufactory factory, described an incident some years ago. Her 
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production department was short of one important material one day and without that 
material, they could not produce. If they stop the production, it would cost a lot to 
her company. So the interview called the supplier company of this material and asked 
if they could send small quantity of this material promptly to her factory. The 
supplier promised at once to send the material to the factory before dark so the 
factory could continue producing. However, she failed to get the material on time 
and the reason was that the deliver person from the supplier company took the wrong 
address so he drove the material to another place. At first, the manager was very 
anxious for the large cost of the delay and angry with the supplier. But the supplier 
showed that he shared the same goal with the manager that he also hoped to deliver 
the material on time and minimize the lost of her factory. So when the mistake 
happened, the supplier carefully listened to problem and used the quickest way to 
send the material to the right place. The supplier also admitted his fault and agreed 
the interviewee’s request to lower the price of this material a little this time to make 
up for some lost for the delay. And later, the supplier and the manager discussed with 
each other on how to avoid the same mistake. The manager felt that their relationship 
was improved after this instance and that she and the supplier were efficient in 
solving this problem. She also gave high rate for innovation and future collaboration.     
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Chapter VI 
DISCUSSION 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the study results and then discusses some 
important findings. Specifically, the findings include issues on the influence of 
opportunism on the outcomes, the relationship between opportunism and goal 
interdependencies, self-interest and opportunism, and opportunism in collectivistic 
cultures. Then it describes the limitations and practical implications and suggests 
possibilitites for future research.  
 
Summary of the Result 
The results support the first four hypotheses about the negative effects opportunistic 
behaviours between partners have on the collaboration. A low level of opportunism 
is needed to help partners improve their work performance and relationship. A high 
level of opportunistic behavior undermines their relationship with their partners, 
lowers their work productivity and reduces the possibility for future collaboration 
and innovation.  
 
When it comes to the factors that affect the level of opportunistic behaviors, goal 
interdependencies between partners are found to be most crucial. Results suggest that 
reducing competitive and independent goals can help to limit opportunities. It may 
also be that strengthening cooperative goals can help to reduce the likelihood of 
opportunistic behavior in supply chain partnerships.  
 
Opportunistic behaviors were found to exist between partners even in the collectivist 
culture in China. Results suggest that goal interdependence theory is still useful in 
studying phenomenon of organizations in collectivist countries like China.  
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Important Findings 
Influence of Opportunism on the Outcomes 
The results suggest that opportunism ruins the partnership in the supply chain. 
Specifically, it undermines partners’ relationships, lowers their work productivity 
and reduces the possibility for future collaboration and innovation. As no previous 
researches have ever explored how opportunistic behavior influence innovation in 
supply chain, here we discuss the important finding that opportunistic behavior 
undermines partners’ ability to innovate.  
 
Innovation  
Developing innovation creates competitive advantage in an organization which 
helps them respond to the changes quicker and better solve problems. Continuing 
innovation in the supply chain collaboration can achieve customer or supplier 
satisfaction by responding to the partners’ needs promptly and adapt to the 
changing marketplace (Williams, 2006). It is an important competitive advantage 
for the organization in a supply chain relationship in the competing market 
(Burpitt & Bigoness, 1997; West, 2002). 
 
Results suggest that managing goal interdependencies properly could help enhance 
innovation in the supply chain through the mediator of opportunism. With little 
competitive and independent goals, partners would engage in few opportunistic 
behaviors. Under low risk of opportunistic behaviors, organizations in supply chain can 
share their knowledge and information more openly and fully. Also, a low level of 
opportunism means that organizations would provide more truthful picture of their own 
business and the collaboration with their partners. As a result, companies could gain 
more new technologies and information from their partners. They could also help each 
other gain more insight to each others’ needs and see their own shortcomings, so that 
they could better improve their operations, products and services. In this way, low 
opportunism helps companies to innovate thus strengthen their market competitive 
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advantage. (Ansari & Modarress, 1990; Child & Yan, 2003; Frey & Schlosser, 1993; 
Hardy, Phillips & Lawrence, 2003; Ireland, Hitt & Vaidyanath, 2003).  
 
Goal Interdependencies and Opportunism 
The type of goal interdependencies was found to be an important predictor of 
opportunism in supply chain partnerships. Results from the correlational and structural 
equation analyzes are quite consistent with the study’s model. The path coefficients 
between competitive goals and opportunism and between independent goals and 
opportunism are both significant. When partners thought that their goal attainments 
are competitively or independently related to their partners, they were more likely to 
behave opportunistically.  
 
Besides, findings further suggest that the influence of competitive and independent 
goals on opportunism may be much stronger than cooperative goals. Cooperative 
goals can not ensure low level of opportunism directly, while competitive and 
independent goals can significantly lead to high level of opportunism. 
 
Although path coefficients of the model and correlational results between 
cooperative goals and opportunism did not directly support the hypothesis that 
cooperative goals could reduce opportunistic behavior, the path coefficients 
involving perceived goal relationships should be interpreted together, because these 
three types of goals are related. The assumption that goals are competitively related 
or independently related implies the assumption that goals are not cooperatively 
related. In this study, competitive and independent goals were positively correlated. 
Both competitive goals (ß = -.098, p < .05) and independent goals (ß = -.197, p < .01) 
had significant positive effects on opportunism and thus we could interpret that the 
absence of cooperative goals had significant effects on opportunism. 
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The above results indicate that cooperative goals can not ensure low level of 
opportunism directly, while competitive and independent goals can significantly 
lead to high level of opportunism. While cooperative goals can not necessarily lead 
to low levels of opportunistic behaviour, the absence of cooperative goals can 
directly impact opportunism, making partners more likely to behave 
opportunistically. 
 
Self-interest and Opportunism 
Transaction cost theorists suggest that self-interest pursuit is harmful and could result 
in opportunism. Also, in the social relation theory, trust, ethics and people’s relation 
may lead to low level of opportunism but they could all be treated as calculative 
self-interests. Completely non-self-interest and trust does not exist in the partnership 
between organizations. Both theories point out that partners are self-interested which 
lead to opportunistic behavior. We can see that previous researches on opportunism 
tended to argue that partners should be less focused on their self-interest zealously 
and more on their common benefits and their relationships.  
 
However, our study used the theory of cooperation and competition to suggest that 
the opportunistic behavior was not necessarily caused by partners’ self-interests 
pursuit or how much they committed on their self-interests. It was actually the 
partners’ goal interdependencies that affected the level of their opportunistic 
behavior. As long as the partners understand that their self-interests are little 
competitive and independent related, even partners are highly committed to their 
self-interests, they could still engage in low level of opportunism to seek for 
positively related interests.  
 
In other words, opportunism is not just the result of pursuit in self-interests but the 
result of how self-interests and goals are related (Kale et al., 2000). The level of 
opportunism depends on the extent to which the partners believe their goals are 
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cooperative, competitive or independent, not on the extent of their self-interests 
pursuit.  
 
Meanwhile, the theory implied that the more committed partners are on self-interest, 
the stronger effects of perceived goals towards opportunism are. When partners are 
highly committed to their self-interests, they are more concerned about the outcomes 
of their opportunistic behavior. Therefore, partners are less likely to engage in 
opportunism if they are more self-interested, as long as they perceive that their goals 
are not negatively or independently related. 
 
Opportunism in Collectivistic Culture  
In this study, the regional difference statistics did not find significant differences 
between those who worked in Beijing, Nanchang or Guangzhou in the respondents’ 
ratings of the scales. These results might imply that in China the influence of region 
and culture on people’s opportunistic behavior and perceived goal interdependencies 
were not direct and absolute, and that these three cities could represent mainland 
China as whole in studying supply chain partnership.  
 
Our result supports that opportunism is still a likely barrier to partnerships under 
specific collectivistic culture in China where people value interpersonal relationship 
highly and tend to avoid the possible behavior that may damage the relationship 
(Ding, 1995; Jehn & Weldon, 1992; Kirkbride, Tang, & Westwood, 1991; Leung, 
1997; Triandis, 1990; Triandis, McCusker, & Hui, 1990; Tse, Francis, & Walls, 
1994). The strong relational bond can not ensure low level of or no opportunism in 
the collectivistic culture. Sometimes, partners have the low level of opportunistic 
behavior just because they know that the bad reputation for those behaviors would 
harm their interests and they understand the value to maintain the social relation. 
Otherwise, they may still be opportunistic when the potential benefit is more than the 
potential lost (Nooteboom, 1996). In addition, collectivists may be exploratory and 
 
52
aggressive toward out-group members, such as those who are in another organization 
(Chen et al., 2002; Triandis, 1990). Competitive and independent goals suggest that 
people and their partners are more of the out-group ones than in-group members, and 
once they think so, they are likely to exploit them thus conduct opportunistic 
behavior (Chen et al., 2002).  
 
In conclusion, Chinese people can still be opportunistic toward their partners in 
general and the possibility of opportunistic behavior, still, depends on how they 
perceive their goals with each other. 
 
Implications 
Results, if continued to be supported, have important practical implications for 
developing sound supply chain partnerships, especially in China.  
 
Current efficient and healthy partnership has a more overall and comprehensive idea. 
In such a competitive marketplace, partners in supply chain face serious stress of 
developing efficient and healthy relationships with each other that could improve work 
productivity, reduce costs, collaborate for the long term, meet customers’ need, 
innovate and so on (Harrison & St John, 1996; Kumar, 1996). Therefore, the four 
outcomes, namely relationship enhancement, work productivity, future collaboration 
and innovation, in this study are crucial in valuating partnerships in the supply chain. 
This study provides both quantitative and qualitative evidence of the value of goal 
interdependencies and their relationship with partnerships, with the predictor of 
opportunism.  
 
Results show that competitive or independent goals between partners would 
encourage partners to behave opportunistically. Thus managing goal 
interdependencies between partners, especially by limiting competitive and 
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independent goals, is necessary to realize a low level of opportunistic behavior which 
leads to favorable outcomes. To develop effective partnership with partners, they 
should first manage their goal interdependencies with their partners. To lessen 
competitive and independent goals, partners could try to: get together often to develop 
a common aims and values, integrate each other’s roles, conduct a common task, 
develop personal relationships, or share some rewards or distributions (Hambrick, 
1994; Hanlon, Meyer, & Taylor, 1994; Li, Xin, Tsui, & Hambrick, 1999; Pearce, 1997; 
Tjosvold & Tjosvold, 1995). Doing these could generate more cooperative goals and 
less competitive and independent goals, between partners in the supply chain.  
 
The findings could have practical implications for companies to do business in 
China. 
Chinese people are regarded as collectivists and concern about their relationships 
with others particularly. But we can not assure that the collectivists could always 
develop good relationships between their partners in the supply chain. Collectivists 
can also be exploratory and aggressive towards others which lead to ruined 
partnerships.  
In order to build good partnerships with Chinese partners, they should first manage 
their goal interdependencies.  
 
This study also opposes the idea in the transaction theory and social theory that the 
more the partners’ pursuit self-interests, the more likely they are opportunistic and 
raises a contrary argument. Self-interest does not necessarily lead to opportunism and 
threaten partnerships. The level of opportunism depends on the extent to which the 
partners believe their goals are cooperative, competitive or independent, not on the 
extent of their self-interests pursuit. Above findings indicate that between partners in 
the supply chain self-interest pursuit is not always harmful. Partners should not be 
advised to avoid self-interests, but be encouraged to limit their competitive and 
independent goals. 
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In this study the theory of goal interdependencies and opportunism, although 
developed in the West (Deutsch, 1973), is proved to be useful in understanding the 
partnerships of supply chain in China. This study’s approaches of identifying three 
different types of goals are found to be useful in collectivistic cultures and in 
determine opportunistic behaviors. Goal interdependence theory can be used to 
understand cross-organizational issues in collectivist cultures.  
 
Limitations  
This study has several limitations. First, the sample and methodology may limit the 
results of this study. The relatively small sample of 86 respondents limits the 
validation and generation of the findings. Although interview is a very useful method 
for this study, its operation makes collecting a wide sample of data difficult. Second, 
regarding internal validity, the data is self-reported and thus is subject to biases and 
may not accurately or completely report the incidences. In addition, the composition 
of the sample of interviewees may limit the generality of the results. In our study, we 
selected data from three different cities in China to make the data more suitable to 
represent the China as a whole. Third, these data are also correlational, which are not 
able to provide direct evidence of causal links between of goal interdependencies, 
opportunistic behaviors, and outcomes.  
 
In addition, the study relied on Western-developed scales. Although most of the 
scales used in this study have been tested in China, researchers have doubted the 
viability of applying scales developed in the West to China because Chinese people’s 
ideas and understandings may be different and are likely to result in different 
outcomes (Helms, 1992; Hofstede, 1993). If the model in this study could be tested 
in the future research in the west, it could provide more direct evidence of the 
cultural equivalence of this study’s measurements of goal interdependencies, 
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opportunism and four outcomes (Van de Vijver & Leung, 1997). Developing 
different sources for the scales could reduce the possibilities of errors and bias than 
one-source method for the results. This study randomly selects the sample of either 
customers or suppliers so that all variables could be measured by both suppliers and 
customers thus improve the results. 
 
Another limitation is that we were only able to do the interview on one part in the 
supply chain partnership for his/her relation to the recalled incident. It is possible that 
the other party might have different perceived goal relationships to the incident, 
might have different perceptions towards the extent of opportunism, and might report 
different outcomes. 
 
Possible Future Research 
During this research, I found some other studies related to this one could be valuable 
to supplement and refine the current findings. These possible future researches are: 
 
First, it would be useful to provide direct verification of the dynamics of cooperative 
goals, opportunism and outcomes in supply chain partnership, with the data gathered 
from both parties in the partnerships.  
 
Second, studies combine both high and low levels of commitment to self-interest 
with cooperative, competitive, and independent goals as the independent variables to 
study opportunistic behavior might be a constructive way to future test our 
cooperation and competition theory and to test the contrasting hypothesis in the 
transaction cost theory as well.  
 
Third, bargaining power is considered to be powerful in determining and 
understanding the opportunistic behavior in the supply chain (Macneil, 1981). Future 
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research could directly investigate the impact of bargaining power on perceived goals 
and opportunism in supply chain partnerships. 
 
Summary 
The results support the first four hypotheses about the negative effects opportunistic 
behaviours between partners have on the collaboration and two hypotheses that 
competitive and independent goals led to opportunistic behaviors.  
 
A low level of opportunism is needed to help partners improve their work 
performance and relationship. At the same time, a high level of opportunistic 
behavior undermines their relationship with their partners, lowers their work 
productivity and reduces the possibility for future collaboration and innovation.  
 
The influence of competitive and independent goals on opportunism may be stronger 
than that of cooperative goals. While cooperative goals is not necessarily lead to low 
level of opportunistic behaviour, the absence of cooperative goals can directly 
influence opportunism, making partners more likely to behave opportunistically. To 
build effective partnerships between partners, partners should manage their goal 
interdependencies with each other by limiting competitive and independent goals. 
 
This study also indicates that self-interest does not necessarily lead to opportunism 
and threaten partners’ partnerships. The level of opportunism depends on the extent 
to which the partners perceive their goals as cooperative, competitive or independent, 
not on the extent of their self-interests pursuit. Results oppose the idea in the 
transaction cost theory that the greater partners are committed to self-interest, the 
more likely the opportunism takes place. The extent of self-interest could just 
influence the impact of the effects of perceived goals.  
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The study tests the generality of some theories. The theory of goal interdependencies 
developed in the West (Deutsch, 1973) is proved to be useful in this study in 
understanding the partnerships of supply chain in collectivistic culture of China. Goal 
interdependence theory can be used for understanding between-organizational issues 
in nonwestern cultures.  
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APPENDIX I 
Questionnaire 
                     Contact: Wu Lanjun, Julie 
       Management Department            Tel.: 2616-8308 Email: l3wu@ln.edu.hk 
 
Supply Chain Partnership Study 
Interviewee: _______________________ 
Your Position: _______________________ 
Years at Organization: _________________ 
Gender ______   Age ______   Education Level ______ 
 
A. We are studying how suppliers, manufacturers, and marketing organizations 
work together on projects that could influent their partnership. Specifically, we 
want you to discuss a concrete example when you interacted with a person (s) 
from someone in another organization in your supply chain as you disagree with 
each other regarding an issue or in some way tried to negotiate in terms of your 
collaboration. The example can be one which the interaction with the person 
from the other company turned out to be successful or one that was less 
successful. (Rephrase if necessary)  
 
Describe what led to the situation, with whom you were working, what happened, 
with whom did you discuss the problem, and people reacted. (Record Verbatim) 
 
 
B.  Scales 
Goal Interdependence 
  (1) What were your objectives in this interaction? 
 
59
       (Record Verbatim) 
 
(2) What were the objectives of the other person in this interaction?  
       (Record Verbatim) 
 
1. In your mind, how related was your reaching your objectives with the other 
reaching his objectives? (reverse-scored) 
Little 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 A Great Deal 
2. How much would your reaching your objectives help the other person(s) reach 
his objectives? 
Little 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 A Great Deal 
3. How much would your accomplishing your objectives interfere with his 
objectives? 
Little 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 A Great Deal 
 
Opportunism 
1) Your partner provided you a completely truthful picture of his company’s 
business in this interaction. (reverse-scored) 
Little 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 A great deal 
2) Complete honesty did not pay when dealing with your partner in this interaction.  
Little 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 A great deal 
3) Sometimes your partner altered the facts slightly in order to get what he need in 
this interaction.  
Little 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 A great deal 
4) Your partner carried out his duties even if you did not check up on him in this 
interaction. (reverse-scored)  
Little 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 A great deal 
5) Your partner had sometimes promised to do things without actually doing them 
later, in this interaction.   
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Little 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 A great deal 
6) Your partner seemed to feel that it is OK to do anything within his means that 
would help further his firm’s interests, in this interaction.  
Little 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 A great deal 
 
Strength of Relationship  
7) How much did this interaction with the other person make you more confident 
that you could work successfully with him in the future? 
Little 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 A great deal 
8) To what extent did this interaction strengthen your relationship with the other 
person? 
Little 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 A great deal 
9) To what extent did this interaction make you more trusting of the other person? 
Little 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 A great deal 
 
Work Productivity  
10) How much did you and the other person make progress on the task because of 
this interaction? 
Little 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 A great deal 
11) How efficiently did you and the other person accomplish the task?  
Little 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 A great deal 
12) How effectively did you and this person work on the task?  
Little 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 A great deal 
 
Future Collaboration  
13)  To what extent do you hope you can work with the other person in the future?  
Little 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 A great deal 
14)  To what extent will you try to seek opportunity to work with the other person 
in the future?  
Little 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 A great deal 
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15)  To what extent would you be very pleased if the other person continued to be 
you partner in the future? 
Little 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 A great deal 
 
Innovation  
16) How much did this interaction help you seek out information about new markets, 
products, and technologies from sources outside the organization?  
Little 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 A great deal 
17) How much did this interaction help you identify and develop skills that can 
improve your ability to serve existing business needs?  
Little 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 A great deal 
18) How much did this interaction help you identify and develop skills that can help 
attract and serve new business needs?  
Little 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 A great deal 
19) How much did this interaction help you seek out and acquire knowledge that may 
be useful in satisfying needs unforeseen by the client?  
Little 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 A great deal 
 
 
 
 
62
REFERENCE 
Alper, S., Tjosvold, D. & Law, K. S. (2000). Conflict management, efficacy and performance 
in organizational teams. Personnel Psychology, 53(3), 625-642. 
Alper, S., Tjosvold, D. & Law, S. A. (1998). Interdependence and controversy in group 
decision making: Antecedents to effective self-managing teams, Organizational 
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 74, 33-52. 
Anderson, J. C. & Narus, J. A. (1990). A Model of Distributor Firm and Manufacturing Firm 
Working Relationships. Journal of Marketing, 54 (1), 42-58. 
Ansari, A. & Modarress, B. (1990). JIT brings problems and solutions, Purchasing World, 
34(3), 47–50. 
Argyle M. (1994). The Psychology of Social Class. London: Routledge. 
Ash C. (2000). Social-Self-Interest. Ann. of Public & Cooperative Economics, 71(2). 
Barney, J. B. (1996). Gaining and Sustaining Competitive Advantage. Reading, MA: 
Addison Wesley. 
Bentler, P. M. & Bonnett, D. G. (1980). Significance tests and goodness of fit in the analysis 
of covariance structure. Psychological Bulletin, 88(3), 588-60. 
Bradach, J. L. & Eccles, R. G. (1989). Price, authority, and trust: from ideal types to plural 
forms. Annual Review of Sociology, 15, 97-118. 
Burpitt, W. J. & Bigoness, W. J. (1997). Leadership and innovation among teams: The 
impact of empowerment. Small Group Research, 28, 414–423. 
Buvik, A. & Gronhaug, K. (2000). Inter-firm dependence, environmental uncertainty and 
vertical co-ordination in industrial buyer–seller relationships. Omega, 28, 445–454. 
Ding D. Z. (1995). Exploring Chinese conflict management styles in joint venture in the 
People’s Republic of China. Management Research News, 19 (9), 45-55. 
Dore R. (1989). Taking Japan seriously, Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Chen, C. C., Peng, M. W. & Saparito, P. A. (2002). Individualism, collectivism, and 
opportunism: A cultural perspective on transaction cost economics. Journal of 
Management, 28, 567–583.  
Child, J. & Yan, Y. (2003). Predicting the performance of international joint ventures: An 
investigation in China. Journal of Management Studies, 40, 283–320. 
Coleman, J. S. (1990). Foundations of social theory. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
Cook, S. (1984). Cooperative interaction in multiethnic contexts. in N. Miller and M. Brewer 
(eds.), Groups in Contact: The Psychology of Desegregation. Academic Press: New 
York, 156–186. 
Cusumano, M. A. & Fujimoto, T. (1991). Supplier relations and management: A survey of 
Japanese, Japanese-Transplant and U.S. auto plants. Strategic Management Journal, 12, 
563-588. 
Dasgupta, P. (1998). Trust as a Commodity, in Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative 
Relations. Annual Review of Sociology, 15, 97-118. 
Deutsch, M. (1973). The resolution of conflict. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Deutsch, M. (1949). A theory of cooperation and competition. Human Relations, 2, 129–152.  
Dore, R. (1983). Goodwill and the spirit of market capitalism. British Journal of Sociology, 
 
63
34, 459-482. 
Douglas, Mary (1990). Converging on Autonomy: Anthropology and Institutional 
Economics in Organization Theory: From Chester Barnard to the Present and Beyond, 
Oliver E. Williamson, ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 98–115. 
Dyer, J. H. & Chu, W. (2003). The role of trustworthiness in reducing transaction costs and 
improving performance: Empirical evidence from the United States, Japan and Korea. 
Organization Science, 14(1), 57–68. 
Dyer, J. H. & Ouchi, W. G. (1993). Japanese-style partnerships: Giving companies a 
competitive edge, Sloan Management Review, 35, 51-63. 
Flanagan, J. C. (1954). The critical incident technique. Psychological Bulletin, 54, 327-358. 
Frey, S. C. & Schlosser, M. M. (1993). ABB and Ford: creating value through co-operation. 
Sloan Management Review, 35(1), 65–72. 
Friman, M., Garling, T., Millett, B., Mattsson, J., & Johnston, R. (2002). An analysis of 
international business– business relationships based on the commitment–trust theory. 
Industrial Marketing Management, 31, 403–409. 
Gambetta, D. (1988). Can we trust trust? In: D. Gambetta, Editor, Trust: making and 
breaking cooperative relation, Basil Blackwell, New York, 213–238. 
Ghoshal, S. & Morgan, P. (1996). Bad for practice: A critique of the transaction cost 
framework. Academy of Management Journal, 21, 13–47. 
Gibbons, R. (1999). Taking Coase Seriously. Administrative Science Quarterly, 44 (March), 
145–57. 
Graham, D. A. & Ellen R. P. (1989). Contract Modification: An Economic Analysis of the 
Hold-Up Game. Law and Contemporary Problems, 52 (1), 9–32. 
Granovetter, M. (1985). Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of 
Embeddedness. American Journal of Sociology, 91 (November), 481–510. 
Griesinger, D. (1990). The human side of economic organization. Academy of Management 
Review, 15, 478–499. 
Hambrick, D. C. (1994). Top management groups: A conceptual integration and 
reconsideration of the “team” label. Research in Organizational Behavior, 16, 
171–213. 
Hanlon, S. C., Meyer, D. C. & Taylor, R. R. (1994). Consequences of gainsharing: A field 
experiment revisited. Group and Organizational Management, 19, 87–111. 
Hardy, C., Phillips, N. & Lawrence T.B. (2003). Resources, knowledge and influence: The 
organizational effects of interorganizational collaboration. Journal of Management 
Studies, 40, 320–347. 
Harrison, J. S. & John, S. (1996). Managing and partnering with external stakeholders, 
Academy of Management Executive 10, 46–60. 
Hart, Oliver D. & John Moore (1999). Foundation of Incomplete Contracts. Review of 
Economic Studies, 66 (1), 115–38. 
Helms, J. E. (1992). Why is there no study of cultural equivalence in standardized cognitive 
ability testing? American Psychologist, 47, 1083-1101. 
Helper S. (1991). Strategy and irreversibility in supplier relations: The case of the U.S. 
automobile industry, Business History Review, 65 (Winter 1991), 781-824.  
Heide & George, J. (1992). Do Norms Matter in Marketing Relationships? Journal of 
 
64
Marketing, 56, 32–44. 
Hill, C. W. L. (1990). Cooperation, Opportunism, and the Invisible Hand: Implications for 
Transaction Cost Theory. The Academy of Management Review, 15(3), 500-513. 
Hofstede, G. (1993). Cultural Constraints in Management Theories. Academy of Management 
Executive(AEX), 7(1), 81-94. 
Hwang, J. J. (2000). The reforms of educational systems and quality: The future of career 
and technical education reform. Journal of Technological and Vocational Education, 57, 
10-14. 
 
Hwang, K. K. (1997-8). Guanxi and mientze: Conflict resolution in Chinese society. 
Intercultural Communication Studies VII, 1, 17-42. 
Hwang, K. K. (1987). Face and Favour: The Chinese Power Game, American Journal 
of Sociology, 92 (4), 944-974. 
Ireland, R. D., Hitt, M. A. & Vaidyanath, D. (2003). Alliance management as a source of 
compeititve advantage. Journal of Management, 28, 413–446. 
Jehn, K. A. & Weldon, F. (1992). A comparative study of managerial attitudes toward 
conflict in the United States and the People's Republic of China: Issues of theory and 
measurement. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Academy of Management, 
Las Vegas, NV. 
Johanson, J. & Mattsson, L. G. (1987). Interorganizational relations in industrial systems: A 
network approach compared with the transactioncost approach. International Studies of 
Management and Organization, 1, 33–80. 
John, George (1984). An Empirical Investigation of Some Antecedents of Opportunism in a 
Marketing Channel. Journal of Marketing Research, 21 (August), 278–89. 
Johnson, D. W. & Johnson, R. T. (1989). Cooperation and competition: Theory and 
research, Edina, MN: Interaction Book Company. 
Johnson, D. W., Maruyama, G., Johnson, R. T., Nelson, D., & Skon, S. (1981). Effects of 
cooperative, competitive, and individualistic goal structures on achievement: A 
meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 89, 47–62. 
Jones G. R. & Hill C. W. L. (1988). Transaction cost analysis of strategy–structure choice. 
Strategic Management Journal, 9 (2), 159–172.  
Kale, P., Singh, H., & Perlmutter, H. (2000). Learning and protection of proprietary assets in 
strategic alliances: Building relational capital. Strategic Management Journal, 21, 
217–237. 
Kirkbride, P. S., Tang, F. Y. & Westwood, R. I. (1991). Chinese conflict preferences and 
negotiating behavior: cultural and psychological influence. Organization Studies, 12(3), 
365-389. 
Kumar, N. (1996). The power of trust in manufacturer–retailer relationships. Harvard 
Business Review, 92–106. 
Lee, D. J., Pae, J. H. & Wong, Y. H. (2001). A model of close business relationships in China 
(guanxi). European Journal of Marketing, 35(1/2), 51-69.  
Leung, K. (1997). Negotiation and reward allocations across cultures. In: P. C. Earley and M. 
Erez, Editors, New perspectives on I/O psychology, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 
640–675. 
 
65
Lewicki, R. J., McAllister, D. J. & Bies, R. J. (1998). Trust and distrust: New relationships 
and realities. Academy of Management Review, 23, 438–458. 
Li, J., Xin, K. R., Tsui, A., & Hambrick, D. C. (1999). Building effective international joint 
venture leadership teams in China. Journal of World Business, 34, 52–68. 
Love, E. D. & Gunasekaran, A. (1999). Learning alliances: A customer-supplier focus for 
continuous improvement in Manufacturing. Industrial and Commercial Training, 31(3), 
88-1999. 
Macaulay S. (1963). Non-contractual relations in business; a preliminary study. American 
Sociological Review, 28, 55-70. 
Macneil, I. R. (1978). Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under 
Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contracts. Northwestern Law Review, 72 (6), 
854–901. 
Macneil, I. R. (1981), Economic Analysis of Contractual Relations: Its Shortfalls and the 
Need for a ‘Rich Classificatory Apparatus’. Northwestern University Law Review, 75, 
1018–63. 
Maitland, I., Bryson, J., & Van de Ven, A. (1985). Sociologists, economists, and 
opportunism. Academy of Management Review, 10, 59–65. 
Markus, H. R. & Kitayama, S. (1991). Culture and Self: Implications for Cognition, 
Emotion, and Motivation. Psychological Review, 98, 224-253. 
Michael, D. (2003). CEO Visions: Collaboration Equals Innovation. InformationWeek, 27.  
Moschandreass, M. (1997). The role of opportunism in transaction cost economics. Journal 
of Economic Issues, 31, 39–55. 
Muris, Timothy J. (1981). Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of Contracts. Minnesota Law 
Review, 65, 521–90. 
Myhr & Spekman (2002). Partnership Performance in Supply Chains – The Impact of 
Collaboration, An article submitted to the Journal of the Academy of Marketing 
Science in the category of Industrial Marketing,  
Nooteboom, B. (1996). Trust, opportunism and governance: A process and control model. 
Organization Studies, 17(6), 985-1010. 
Nooteboom, B. (1996). Will opportunism go away? SOM theme B: Inter-Firm Coordination 
and Change: Marketing and Networks. 
Palay, Thomas M. (1984). Comparative Institutional Economics: The Governance of Rail 
Freight Contracting. Journal of Legal Studies, 13 (June), 265–87. 
Parkhe, A. (1993). Strategic alliance structuring: a game theoretic and transaction cost 
examination of interfirm cooperation. Academy of Management Journal 36(4), 
794–829. 
Pearce, R. J. (1997). Towards understanding joint venture performance and survival: A 
bargaining and influence approach to transaction cost theory. Academy of Management 
Review, 22, 203–235. 
Provan, K. G. & Skinner, S. J. (1989). Interorganizational Dependence and Control as 
Predictors of Opportunism in Dealer-Supplier Relations. The Academy of Management 
Journal, 32, 202-212. 
Roland, A. (1988). In Search of Self in India and Japan. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press. 
 
66
Rogers, M. (1998). Definition and measurement of innovation. 
Sabel, C. (1993). Studied Trust, in R.Swedberg (ed.), Explorations in Economic Sociology, 
New York, Russell Sage, 104-144. 
Schwartz, N. (1999). Self-reports. American Psychologist, 54, 93-105. 
Shweder, R. A. & Bourne, E. J. (1984). Does the Concept of the Person Vary Cross- 
Culturally? In R.A. Shweder and R.A. Levine (eds) Culture Theory, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, Ch.6. 
Smith, P. B. & Bond, M. H. (1998). Social psychology across cultures (2nd ed.). 
Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ. 
Spekman, R. E., Kamauff, J. W. & Myhr, N. (1998). An empirical investigation into supply 
chain management: A perspective on partnerships. International Journal of Physical 
Distribution and Logistics Management 28, 630–650.  
Stanne, M. B., Johnson, D. W., & Johnson, R. T. (1999). Does competition enhance or 
inhibit motor performance: A meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 125, 133–154. 
Thomas, R. J. (1993). New Product Development, New York: John Wiley & Sons. 
Thomas, W. (1993). Diffusion of Innovations and Policy Decision-Making. Journal of 
Communication, 43, 30-45. 
Tjosvold, D. (1998). The cooperative and competitive goal approach to conflict: 
Accomplishments and challenges. Applied Psychology: An International Review, 47, 
285-313. 
Tjosvold, D., Andrews, I.R., and Struthers, J. (1991). Power and Interdependence in Work 
Groups: Views of Managers and Employees. Group and Organization management, 16 
(3), 285. 
Tjosvold, D. & Sun, H. (2000). Social face in conflict: Effects of affronts to person and 
position in China. Group Dynamics, 4, 259-271. 
Tjosvold, D. & Tjosvold, M. M. (1995). Cooperation theory, constructive controversy, and 
effectiveness: Learning from crises. In R. A. Guzzo & E. Salas (Eds.), Team 
effectiveness and decision making in organizations (pp. 79–112). San Francisco: 
Jossey-Bass. 
Triandis, H. C. (1989). The self and social behavior in differing cultural contexts. 
Psychological Review, 96, 506–520. 
Triandis, H. C., McCusker, C. & Hui, C. H. (1990). Multimethod probes of individualism 
and collectivism. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 59, 1006–1020.  
Tse D. K., Francis J. & Wall J. (1994). Cultural differences in conducting intra- and 
inter-cultural negotiations: A Sino-Canadian comparison. Journal of International 
Business Studies, 25, 537–555. 
Van de Vijver, F. J. R., & Leung, K. (1997). Methods and data analysis for cross-cultural 
research. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 
Walker, S. & Truly, E. L. (1992). The Critical Incident Technique: philosophical and 
methodological contributions to marketing research. In C. T. Allen (ed.), Proceedings 
of the American Marketing Association's Winter Educator's Conference Chicago, IL: 
American Marketing Association, 270-275. 
Wathne, K. H., & Heide, J. B. (2000). Opportunism in interfirm relationships: Forms, 
outcomes, and solutions. Journal of Marketing, 64, 35–51. 
 
67
Williamson, O. E. (1996). The Mechanisms of Governance. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
Williamson, O. E. (1993). Opportunism and its critics. Managerial and Decision Economics, 
14, 97-197. 
Williamson, O. E. (1991). Comparative economic organization: The analysis of discrete 
structural alternatives. Administrative Science Quarterly, 63, 269–296. 
Williamson, O. E. (1985). The economic institutions of capitalism. New York: Free Press. 
Williamson, O. E. (1980). The Organization of Work: A Comparative Institutional 
Assessment. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 1(1), 538. 
Williamson, O. E. (1975). Markets and Hierarchies. New York: Free Press. 
Williamson, O. E. & Ouchi, W. G. (1981). The markets and hierarchies and visible hand 
perspectives' in Perspectives on organizational design and behavior W. F. Joyce (ed.), 
347-370, New York: Wiley.  
Williams, J. P. (2006). Collaboration in the Supply Chain Speeds Innovation. 
Wilson, James A. (1980). Adaptation to Uncertainty and Small Numbers Exchange: The 
New England Fish Market. Bell Journal of Economics, 11, 491–504. 
Womack, James P., Daniel T. Jones, and Daniel Roos (1990). The Machine That Changed 
the World: Based on the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 5-Million Dollar 
5-Year Study on the Future of the Automobile. New York: Rawson Associates. 
WONG, A., TJOSVOLD, D. & YU, Z. (2005). Organizational Partnerships in China. Journal 
of applied psychology, 90(44), 782-791. 
Zaheer, A. B., McEvily, B. & Perrone, V. (1998). Does trust matter? Exploring the effects of 
interorganizational and interpersonal trust on performance. Organizational Science, 9, 
1–20. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
